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Shared pain, half a pain? ‘Overcoming’ barriers to innovation through cooperation 
 
Abstract: In recent empirical literature an increasing attention is devoted to the obstacles 
that hamper innovation, their impact on firms’ engagement in innovation and their effect on 
the propensity to innovate (e.g. Baldwin and Lin, 2002; Galia and Legros, 2004; Tiwari et al., 
2008; Savignac, 2008; Iammarino et al., 2009; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2010; Galia et al., 2012; 
Blanchard et al., 2013).  
 
Investigating innovation obstacles is of obvious policy relevance. It is crucial to enlarge the 
population of innovators and increase the innovation performance of the existing base of 
innovative firms (D’Este et al., 2012; 2014; Pellegrino and Savona, 2013). From both an 
innovation management and policy perspectives, it is particularly important to identify the 
factors that are more likely to attenuate or overcome the negative impact of innovation 
barriers (e.g. D’Este et al., 2014).  
 
In the paper we shed new light on the relation between cooperation and barriers to 
innovation. While it might well be likely that cooperation itself is a source of failure (e.g. 
Lhuillery and Pfister, 2009), it is interesting to ask whether firms perceiving obstacles to 
innovation tend to overcome them by establishing cooperation agreements with external 
partners. We argue that firms experiencing obstacles to innovation undertake cooperative 
activities in order to mitigate the negative effects of such barriers on innovation. Following 
this reasoning the presence of barriers to innovation becomes a ‘driver’ of cooperation. In 
addition, it can be stated that different kinds of barriers may lead to different kinds of 
cooperation (e.g. with research organizations or firms) depending on what the firm is 
searching for and on what kind of barrier-related negative effects is trying to mitigate. As a 
further step in our analysis, we question whether different types of barriers are 
complements or rather substitutes in influencing the cooperation propensity.  
 
We exploit the not micro-aggregated information of CIS4 database for France. We restrict 
our focus to manufacturing firms. In addition, the sample is constrained to innovating firms, 
because of the CIS questionnaire structure (i.e. cooperation activities are only pursued by 
those firms declaring to have introduced some kind of innovation).  
 
The model we apply has the following baseline form:  
 
Cooperation_i= a + b_1 Barriers_i + b_2 CTRL_i + ε_i  
 
where Cooperation is a vector of cooperation activities/partners, Barriers is a vector of 
specific types of obstacles to innovation perceived by the firm, CTRL is a vector of controls 
and ε is the error term. The estimation technique is based on a set of simple probit 
regressions, which allows us to point out the relations between innovation barriers (cost -
COST-, market -MKT- and knowledge -KNOW- ones) and cooperation (general -COOP-; 
cooperation with other firms -COOP_FIRM-; and cooperation with research organisations -
COOP_ORG-).  
 
The second part of the empirical analysis tests for the complementary/substitution effects 
between couples of barriers on the propensity to cooperate. In order to implement the tests 
we consider the ‘cooperation function’ of firm i (COOP_i) as the firm’s objective function; 
we focus on two types of barriers at a time that can affect the firm’s cooperation function, 
b' and b'':  
 
COOP_i= COOP_i(b', b'', θ_i), ∀i  
 
Each firm i faces a combination of the two barriers, (b’, b’’ ∈ B) and a set of controls θ_i, 
including the remaining barrier. Complementarity between the two different barriers may 
be analysed by testing whether COOP_i(b', b'', θ_i) is supermodular in b'and b''. Our aim is 
to derive a set of inequalities that are tested in the empirical analysis. Each firm is in one of 
the 4 following states of the world: it faces both b’and b’’, neither of the two, or one but not 
the other, giving birth to four consequent elements in the set B (forming a lattice): 
B={{00},{01},{10},{11}}. It is possible to demonstrate that b’ and b’’are complements and 
hence COOP_i is supermodular if and only if:  
 
COOP_i(11,θ_i) + COOP_i(00,θ_i) ≥ COOP_i(10,θ_i) + COOP_i(01,θ_i)  
or  
COOP_i(11,θ_i) - COOP_i(00,θ_i) ≥ [COOP_i(10,θ_i)-COOP_i(00,θ_i)] + [COOP_i(01,θ_i)-
COOP_i(00,θ_i)]  
 
In order to test for complementarities or for substitution effects we operationalise the 
methodological framework in two steps. In the first step we set up the ‘Cooperation 
function’, that can be modelled as follows using two types of barriers BARR1 and BARR2, 
while we control for BARR3:  
 
[COOP]i = b0i[Controls] + aBARR3+  
+b1i[BARR1_D(1)/BARR2_D(1)] +  
+b2i[BARR1_D(1)/BARR2_D (0)]+  
+b3i[BARR1_D(0)/BARR2_D (1)] +  
+b4i[BARR1_D(0)/BARR2_D (0)] + ui  
 
Since the cooperation variable COOP is a dummy variable (as the two sub-types of 
cooperation COOP_ORG and COOP_FIRM), a set of probit regressions is run, excluding the 
constant term, given that all the four states of the world must be included in the 
specification and provided with a specific coefficient each: b1, b2, b3 and b4. Once the 
coefficients are retrieved by the probit, the next step of the analysis is to test the 
hypotheses implementing a set of Wald tests, which allows us to test the following linear 
restriction on the state-of-the-world-dummies coefficients: b1+b4=b2+b3. Where b1 is 
associated to the (1,1) state of the world; b2 is associated to the (1,0) state of the world; b3 
is associated to the (0,1) state of the world and b4 is associated to the (0,0) state of the 
world. Coupling the information provided by the Wald tests with the sign of the inequalities 
-also confirmed by one-sided tests on the linear combination of the parameters- we know 
the direction towards which a rejection of the null leads us in terms of supermodularity 
(complementarity) or submodularity (substitutability). On the one hand, if b1+b4-b2-b3≥0 
and the Wald test leads us to reject the null, then we can argue that we are in presence of 
supermodularity and hence of complementary barriers; on the other hand, submodularity 
holds if b1+b4-b2-b3≤0 and the Wald test null is rejected as well.  
 
Results show linkages among barriers and cooperation strategies. Cost barriers are 
positively related to all types of cooperation. Firms thus resort to cooperation as a result of 
a cost-sharing strategy. We also notice that cooperation with research organisations is 
triggered by knowledge obstacles: as expected firms collaborate with research institutes 
and universities to mitigate shortages of skills and competencies. Concerning the analysis of 
the supermodularity/submodularity among the barriers, we notice the absence of 
complementarity and the presence of substitutability effects. In other terms, jointly 
experiencing high levels of different barriers to innovation does not lead to more 
cooperation. On the contrary, the joint presence of barriers which involve high knowledge 
obstacles reduces the propensity to cooperate. A spectrum of innovation obstacles that 
includes knowledge shortages, and thus possibly involves the lack of sufficient absorptive 
capacity, leads the firm to refocus on internal innovation activities, abandoning cooperation.  
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